© Tasos Zembylas, 2001

Art and Conflict – Some Notes on the Social Negotiation of the Concept of Art

Introduction

Art is capable of representing political power. This is something it has been doing for centuries and for this purpose it is undoubtedly still used. This, however, is just one side of the relationship between art and power. Art can sometimes refuse to perform this function. Then it represents opposition and evokes conflicts. I would like to address this field of tension, even though I do not wish to explicitly advocate an aesthetics of subversion or resistance. The controversial nature of art is in any case a social phenomenon that points to the currently effective limits of acceptability of art in a given social constellation.

The fact that public conflicts have only sporadically been unleashed over works with a claim to artistic validity (I deliberately refrain from saying „artworks“ since this status is controversial in the conflict) expresses two things:

-          First, the relatively small number of art conflicts indicates that the large majority of art production is conventional (albeit not in a pejorative sense). Thus the art world and the public at large do not call into question its claim to validity as artworks.

-           Second, the at least in part controversial nature of art is an indication that art is not a self-contained, self-referential social system, as for instance Niklas Luhmann or Jean-François Lyotard claimed by reference to various arguments. The argument as to the loss of the cultural relevance of contemporary art (as put forward by, inter alia, Hermann Lübbe, and in a different context, by Peter Bürger) hardy seems compelling.

I do not just see the semantic openness and the pluralism of artistic practices as being prerequisites of art conflicts but rather first and foremost the practical relevance of the recognition of an entity (object, concept, action) as a work of art. Both in legal terms (i.e., copyright law, tax law, criminal law, social insurance law, etc.) and in the art market, it makes a difference whether an individual has the status of an artist or whether an object is recognized as an artwork or not. The conflation of art and conflict thus presupposes the following:

-          First, it is necessary for people to see the difference between art and non-art as significant and to attribute an epistemic value to aesthetic judgements.

-          Second, in the case of conflicts in the political realm there must be a public who is interested in artistic matters and is involved in and identified with them. The existence of a goal or of prevailing material or immaterial interests usually accounts for the individual conviction that it is worth fighting over matters related to art.

Art Conflicts – An Attempt At Analysis

There are different types of conflicts that are triggered off by artworks. Both the initial situation and the intentions of the parties involved vary so that I can only formulate a general typology of conflicts here. One type of conflicts is related to private law (e.g., copyright, labor and contractual law). This type of conflict is normally not explicitly political. I will not take it into account here so that I can focus on conflicts that are primarily public in nature. Here we can distinguish between two main types:

a)      Conflicts that at least at first glance revolve around the interpretation and the aesthetic appreciation of an artwork.

b)      Conflicts that explicitly call into question the legal legitimacy of the publication of an artwork.

To the extent that conflicts are deployed on the level of aesthetic appreciation, aesthetic criteria are explicitly applied. Here one could, for instance, think of a public debate on whether an artistic project (e.g., Hans Haacke’s installation “Der Bevölkerung” in the light courtyard of the German Reichstag) is worth supporting or on the debates regarding the sense of a memorial, on the architectural quality of a public representational building, etc. Statements on artistic value cannot be reduced to distinctions or categories such as good vs. bad or beautiful vs. ugly. Art judgments are complex in terms of structure and content because they take recourse to different concepts of art, objectives, values and cultural practices. It would thus be short-sighted and naive to believe that such conflicts are only based on particular differences in taste and opinion. On the contrary, art conflicts that are fought out in public almost always touch on basic questions of civil society. If, for instance, some art aficionados do not find the “Fledermaus” (an operetta by Johann Strauss) staging of Hans Neunfels to their liking and wish the artistic director Gérard Mortier, „good riddance“ as could be read in some newspaper articles last summer (2001), in the entailing debates the issue was not just: „what is a good interpretation and staging of an oeuvre?“ and the assessment of Mortier’s artistic decisions. Here there is also a more general underlying question: Is it more important to systematically cultivate certain traditions, such as the image of the Salzburg Festival, and thus encourage a stable and homogenous identity? Or is it generally more desirable to normalize the way one deals with difference and to thus see cultural alterity as a legitimate manifestation? If the goal is homogeneity and coherence, then all of these „nest foulers“, „anti-establishment artists“ and „decadent nihilists“ who “abuse our hard-earned money”, have no business in our beautiful country. [i] The consequence of this political rhetoric is the demand „Get rid of those scoundrels!” [ii] Yet if the political community seeks to deal with otherness in a positive way, then it must be willing to recognize that difference and confrontations enrich social life. On the one hand, such confrontations promote active participation in social life. On the other, they can stimulate contacts and exchanges between social groups who have previously maintained little contacts with each other. This can lead to a revision of deeply rooted prejudices and enable mutual understanding.

The second type of conflict that questions the legitimacy of an artwork has to do with the raison d’être of a work of art. Here I’d like to mention some well-known examples from recent years: Robert Mapplethorpe’s exhibition „Perfect Moment“ in New York in 1989, Hans Haacke’s installation „Und Ihr habt doch gesiegt“ in Graz 1988, Otto Mühl’s painting „Apokalypse“ in 1998 in the Wiener Secession as well as Chris Ofili’s painting „The Holy Virgin Mary“ in the group show „Sensation – Young British Art“ at the Brooklyn Museum in New York in 1999, the staging of Thomas Bernhard’s theatre piece „Heldenplatz“ at the Vienna Burgtheater in 1988, the first showing of Herbert Achternbusch’s film „Das Gespenst“ in Graz 1983 and of Virginie Despentes’ film „Baise moi“ in France in 2000 among others. One could, of course, add other examples to this list, as for instance, Nazi agitation (poems with xenophobic contents, pictures with swastikas) that claim legitimacy with reference to the freedom of art and artistic expression.

The legitimacy of questioning the freedom of exhibition and publication of a controversial artwork results from the fact that such artworks make inroads into symbolic value spheres that are very important, even “sacrosanct” to a state or individual social groups. These value spheres comprise the symbolism of a state or religion, general morals, the human dignity of the individual, etc. as objects of legal protection by the constitution, that is to say, are generally speaking aspects that have to do with the identity and self-respect of a human being. Seen in this light, art conflicts are an expression of profound cultural and political differences that should not be minimized or trivialized.

The Inevitability of Art Conflicts

Art conflicts can be provoked artificially. They are then, as Lewis Coser described them, “unreal” conflicts. [iii] Yet some conflicts are not external but stem, as alluded to above, from the given social and hegemonial formation. For the further analysis and understanding of these conflicts it is necessary to grasp their underlying causes. Some causes lie in the concrete social constellation of the actors and can be revealed by means of a sociological analysis of the situation. Other causes elude such a description since understanding them would require an epistemic insight into the process of ascribing meaning and value. The constitution of meaning and value should thus be understood here not as a subjective act of consciousness or as a psychological process in terms of empathy. Understanding is more fundamental and primarily represents in keeping with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger a practical function of the mastery of a language game and a function of the realization of life (“Being-in-the-World”). The “seeing as” – an apt characterization of perception and of understanding – indicates that these acts do not glean an objectively given meaning but rather both are based on schemes and contain sediments of previous acts. Cognition is, in other words, linked to habits and typicity. These are generally effective prior to reflection, that is to say they cannot be fully grasped by individuals. For this reason the horizon of an individual’s understanding is by no means infinite. Understanding is circumscribed by the lifeworld and the practical mooring of an individual as a participant in one (or more) social collective(s). This embeddedness of understanding in practical life does not, however, imply any determinism. In each process of understanding the relative indeterminacy of acts and symbols create leeway for interpretation that can be occupied and thus leave each process of understanding open. This is the reason why we constantly find a diversity of interpretations in each and every social situation.

The analysis of the perception and interpretation of an artwork is of central relevance as these acts, in short the reception of art, are essential for the existence of artworks. While artworks have a form of materialization (concepts, objects or performances), they only become actualized through active reception. “Esse est percipi!“ (“Being is been perceived!”) [iv] In any case, the forms of reception vary. Humans can hear, see and read artworks in a variety of ways – not so much subjective, but rather intersubjectively, i.e., in keeping with shared habits, conventions of perception, and patterns of interpretation. The results of perception and understanding are often articulated emotionally (and are thus emotive), because the articulation in language of tacit and semi-subconscious movements of thought that constitute the process of ascribing meaning and value is only possible to a certain degree. While emotional reactions – enthusiasm, astonishment, bewilderment, indignation, etc. – are not „free of ideology“, they do differ from formulated aesthetic judgements (in Kant’s terminology „reflexive aesthetic judgements“). In connection with such acts of perception and understanding, subjective evidence, i.e., the feeling of immediacy of “sense-giving” plays an important role. The impression of immediacy in grasping meaning generates in the beholder a feeling of certainty that makes it more difficult to explain further the ascription of meaning. Certainty stems from familiarity and identification with one’s own cultural experiences, as there are always certain sentences and presuppositions that are exempted from all doubt. Perception subsequently becomes something that is completely taken for granted.

In summary, I view the meaning and value of an artwork as virtual moments that can be actualized in different ways. They are semantic constructions that emerge in the course of the interaction between work, context of presentation and reception in diverse forms. The understanding of art is also not to be separated from the given underlying and culturally valid practices. We see art objects as aesthetic in one case and as political, sensually or historically oriented, etc. in an other, depending on current expectations, interpretative framework and institutional context.

Reasons, Motives and Interests

The fact that we interpret artworks in different ways generates dissense, but dissense alone does not yet cause a conflict. People generally also need motives and reasons to instigate conflict. In a concrete social situation they have to perceive vital interests whose realization is worth a dispute.

Conflicts about artworks can emerge spontaneously in a certain sense, since the dissonance of interests and the incommensurability of many art views provides enough material for conflicts. Conflicts, however, can also be deliberately provoked as part of a strategy of self-presentation and intervention. By the same token, political parties can gain status as representatives of certain social groups or as moral authorities. The search for adversaries is, as is well known, a promising approach to unite various social groups behind one. If conflicts are deliberately fought out in public, then the contrahents are not so keen on persuading the opposing party in the course of an argumentative dispute but in bringing to bear a specific concern. The public realm thus represents a sort of arena and is also a means for the realization of specific goals.

It is also important to draw a distinction between causes, triggers and symptoms of conflict. The analysis and explanation of the formative conditions of conflicts must try to reveal possible underlying causes and background interests. Such an analytic approach is necessary because the contrahents usually define their positions but do not state their central interests and motives. Many conflicts that are carried out in public are explicitly linked to concrete political intentions. On the one hand, a number of artists are themselves politically active and see their artistic work as engaged, political, interventionist art. They make a statement on topical social issues and sometimes even dare to address taboo themes (sexuality, violence, discrimination etc.) On the other hand, there are a number of cultural projects and cultural events that are financed by the government and are linked with certain objectives, as for instance, with the intention of creating a link between “nation” and “culture“. This is partly true of the design of country pavilions at the international art biennials, as well as of focus on one particular country at the annual Frankfurt book fair. The presentation of art in such contexts is seen as a means for constituting a national-cultural identity. Subsequently, at least in the minds of some cultural politicians certain normative functional expectations are triggered which art is to fulfill. The dispute about the adequacy and effectivity of art selection with regard to the fulfillment of such normative expectations is preprogrammed. Even then, when aesthetic aspects are foregrounded in the public dispute, political and ideological motives are central. This indicates that artworks are often place holders for something else. To the extent that artworks are used (or abused) as proxies for conflict, aesthetic and symbolic confrontations have an immanent political character. The concept of cultural hegemony is relevant for understanding this dimension of art conflicts.

What is decisive for the concrete analysis of each particular case, is, first and foremost, the clarification of the question: For whom is X, that is, a controversial artwork or artistic act, „art“ or „non-art“, „obscene“, „immoral“, „offensive“ and „defamatory“ or merely „socio-critical“ and hence “acceptable”? This question should not lead one to believe, first, that certain positions are generated by individuals and, second, that there is a binding, objectifiable interpretation of an artwork that we can assimilate by means of an argumentative rationality. By this I do not mean to say that moral or aesthetic conflicts are irrational. It is just to emphasize that we cannot claim that such kind of conflicts are based on a number of assertions that can be true or false. In addition the aspect of individual committment to arts has a central significance. Conflicts on cultural values and world images correlate with social practices and political positions that cannot be simply changed by the persons affected like pieces of clothing.

Dealing with Conflicts

The American political scientist Russell Hardin defines conflict as a state in which „one party can only gain if another loses“. [v] This is an interesting remark. It certainly seems plausible to the extent that it underscores the agonal character of conflicts. However, it simplifies matters too greatly, since a resolution of conflicts is not just an either-or result, it can also be achieved by a settlement. Ralf Dahrendorf has astutely noted that the maturity of a society can be assessed on how it relates to its conflicting nature. [vi]

It is well-known that conflicts are phenomena that occur in all social formations and political orders. Value conflicts represent a special sort of conflict. They are, as William Gallie has noted, „head-on conflicts of interests or tastes or attitudes, which no amount of discussion can possibly dispel; we are consequently inclined to dismiss the so-called rational defences of the contesting parties as at best unconscious rationalisations and at worst sophistical special pleadings.“ [vii] The state (legislation, jurisdiction, political system) has the task of intervening in conflicts to regulate and mediate. The responsibility of a liberal democratic state is also to constitute and promote a public realm with the greatest possible pluralism. The concept of public realm designates a relatively diffuse sphere in which numerous members of a community come together to communicate, to present their interests and opinions and to debate them – Jürgen Habermas refers to it as a “network for communication“. [viii]

Political conflicts that are fought out in public differ from private, interpersonal conflicts, first, by the large number of individuals that are affected by them and second, by the fact that not everyone affected can have a say. The legitimation of the representatives of the various groups who appear as „speakers“ of a community is often very questionable. In such political/cultural conflicts the public realm can serve as an arena in which the conflict is fought out. Yet the public realm is no homogenous and transparent place. A public forum produces a counter-public, contradiction and resistance. Thus there are constantly several public realms that are formed in public space, which however only in part correspond to the heterogeneity of the social.

The Media Public Sphere as an Arena

In modern societies, public places are largely defined by the participation of the mass media and other political organizations. The resulting forums are stages for (self) mise-en-scènes and (self) representation. Thus the public appearance is governed by the indelible awareness of the actors that they are being watched by a mass public whose attention and empathy they have to win. The discourse ability of the actors in the mass media is eliminated by the growing visuality of the media (in particular that of TV and the Internet.) The form of presentation counts more than the content. In the media public there is communication, but the communication is general not in the sense of a dialogue but in that of propaganda. All anticipatory measures for intensifying and dramatizing self-presentation, beginning with the hair style, colour selection of a tie to the selection of words, the verbal intonation or the significant shaking of one’s head, find rich and precise application. Media appearances are meanwhile organized and taken care of by experts.

The deficits in democracy that can be noted in today’s media landscape can hardly be emphasized enough. The existing market concentration as well as the fundamental excessive marketing of public forums has a number of negative effects on the way political concerns unfold and are articulated. Since the access to the media platforms has become an extraordinarily expensive commodity, people’s real access to the media public realm is everything but free or egalitarian. The present media public is definitely not the discursive public that many democracy theorists desire. On the basis of these considerations the public strikes me as a place of political conflict in general as not an adequate medium for finding consensual problem solutions, to the extent that the minimum conditions for a dialogue are not really given. Media appearance does not seek to convince the discourse participants of the correctness of one’s own viewpoint, but rather to discriminate and demonize the adversaries so as to generate empathy for oneself. It is at least sufficient if one succeeds in unifying a significant group behind oneself. The power asymmetry which results, for instance, from the inequal access of conflict parties to the media public and differences in information, not to mention the different resources that can be mobilized in each case, is decisive for the influence on the public process of opinion formation and the outcome of the conflict. One can still remember the heated debates in the American press on the so-called “obscene” art and the „community values“ in the early nineties or the debates on a German dominant culture (“Leitkultur”) and communal funding policy in 2000 or the public irritation about the design of the hall of the provincial government in Klagenfurt. [ix] A public ruling that is suggested by the presence of the media ultimately exerts massive pressure on political decision-making authorities (e.g., also on courts). In such cases the main issue is the hegemonial claim – “Kulturkampf” (cultural battle) is a fitting metaphor for this. What prevails is not the better argument but the stronger fighter. Public realm as a neutral space of negotiation for ideas and suggestions revealed itself to be a Fata Morgana and part of the ideology that legitimizes the existing oligarchical structures as “democratic.”

The Courts as Conflict-Resolver

If a conflict party wants to prevent the staging, exhibition or publication of a work it may have to impose its goal by a court decision. Recourse to the courts as a way of enforcing one’s own interests is usually the option when the plaintiff sees the dialogue as having failed or as an ineffective means for enforcing one’s own interests. Asking the courts to impose a ban or sanctions against a disliked artist is, however, only possible if there is a criminal offense – to be more precise, if a legal interest protected by the constitution (civil rights, personal rights etc) is violated by an artistic achievement. Often this involves violations against religious peace or a denigration of religious doctrines or state symbols, a violation of an individual’s rights (slander, violation of a highly personal realms of life or honor), sexual offenses (violation of the pornography law, violation of morals, of public decency or of the children and young persons act). While in most European countries there is a censorship ban grounded in the constitution, the lawmaker speaks of the „immanent limits of the freedom of art“, thereby recognizing the general right of each individual to appeal to a court to enforce a ban of publication under certain conditions. The precarious thing about such measures is [x] that such a ban radically negates the existential right of the artwork in question, since a work can actually cease to exist once that its publication is banned. The existence of an artwork is contingent on its being perceived – perceived by a communicatiive and art-insterested public.

The justification of a court-imposed ban of an exhibition or a performance is a repressive act of the state, which is justified by stating that the freedom of art is not without a limit. Who would want to call this into question? The European Court of Human Rights has, however, noted that this freedom of opinion and artistic expression must also apply for such expressions that “violate, shock or upset the country or a part of the population”. [xi] The distinction between making warranted claim to the guarantee of art freedom and abuse of the freedom of art is a value judgement that – apart from the protection of the unwilling observer – is generally difficult to legitimate in the spirit of a liberal attitude. There are cases in which a transgression of boundaries and a violation of taboos are productive in the sense that they call into question the meaning of taboos or because they address to date unreflected or suppressed social issues. There are undoubtedly also cases of boundaries being transgressed that a liberal-democratic society cannot tolerate – as, for instance, racist utterances or an incitement. One could now ask whether in principle a court hearing is the right medium for dealing with art conflicts in the political realm as these conflicts are usually cultural value conflicts. Some constitutional experts describe this as a case of overtaxing the law and the individual judges. [xii] This claim is, in my view, really worth reflecting on. We must examine it in connection with an analysis of the process of court decisions.

In the Austrian legal situation the freedom of art is a legal object protected by the constitution. Fundamentally, it can only be limited if it massively limits other constitutional items. For instance, in the case of the reproach of obscenity or the denigration of religious doctrines, the court must first ascertain whether such circumstances actually exist and second in the case in which interests are being weighed assess whether it justifies a limitation or suspension of the freedom of art. In various legal texts we can find some constructions with which the lawmaker hopes to help the courts reach a decision. Such a construct takes into account “the moral feelings of the average person” or “of the moral values of present-day society” or the existence of an even anonymous “justified offense“. What at first perhaps seems possible to grasp proves in the practical application to be completely diffuse. No one can say who the “average person” is, which values the present society has or how one can recognize whether there is a legitimate public nuisance. All these concepts are misleading. Even if social statistics could infer the normative orientation of the “average individual” on the basis of complex sampling procedures and represenative analyses, the actual finding would not have any special bearing on the possible limitation of the freedom of art. The constitutional guarantee of art freedom implicitly presupposes that art requires special protection, mainly because it cannot or must not always adhere to average values. If it were to do so, or if it were required to do so, then there would be no reason at all for the legislator to issue a guarantee for the freedom of art. (Of course, there will be those who will raise the objection that the guarantee of the freedom of art can only be understood as a right to repel arbitary actions taken by the state authorities and that it implies no subjective rights and entitlements. That is to say, it has no limiting effect on whether the basic rights of third parties are worthy of being protected.) Since the concepts “legitimate public nuisance” and “average individual” are diffuse points of reference, though commonly used in legislation, they often have fatal and not-so liberal results. [xiii]

Jurisdiction as an Instrument of Political Control

The far-reaching issue of court decisions on the freedom of art can also be analyzed empirically. If we examine the history of Austrian legislation and jurisdiction on this theme over the last thirty years in Austria (Josef Isensee has referred to it critically as a “history of embarrassments on the part of judges” [xiv] ), we can speak of three phases:

1.      Up until the beginning of the seventies courts regularly addressed the issue of art or non-art in an explicit way and tried to deny incriminated artworks or art actions (Vienna Actionism, P. Weibel, V. Export and others) the character of art. If the judges were unable to recognize “genuine artistic aspiration“ and “serious artistic values“ (Supreme Court of Vienna 1971), it was then considerably easier to legally legitimate the use of criminal norms and to impose relatively severe penalties against the incriminated artists.

2.      As part of the liberalization efforts of the Socialist government under Kreisky in the early seventies, a slow change of climate could be noted, which culminated in the decree on the guarantee of the freedom of art (art. 17a StGG, 1982). The courts changed their line of argumentation. The fear that court decisions could be tainted in an unwarranted way by the taste of the judges forced the judges to evade the question as to whether an action or work was “art“ or not. The grounds of the court in the case of Achternbusch (LG-Graz, 1984) are exemplary: “One could not get around stating that it was in fact a work of art ...“. [xv] The condemnation of an artwork took place by stating the criminal circumstances and the argument that artistic freedom is not stronger than the protection of other basic rights.

3.      The third phase was introduced in the nineties. The ongoing jurisdiction of the European Court on Human Rights made it more difficult to criminally prosecute an artist. (In 1965 it was still possible to prosecute Günter Brus for his action „Wiener Spaziergang“ (“Viennese stroll”) due to disturbance of the public safety and order. Brus had simply covered himself with white paint and wanted to walk through the centre of Vienna.) In addition there was also the slight danger that the jurisdiction in the public would be publicly labeled as too „conservative“ or „reactionary“. The new means for exerting political pressure against unpopular art was now: allocating money or rather the cutting and withdrawal of public art funding (see, e.g., „Public Netbase“ Wien 2000, „Unikum“ Klagenfurt 2000, Tanztheater „Ikarus“ Klagenfurt 1995ff.). [xvi]

The legimation of such measures is based on a simple pattern. It is said that the art involved does not meet the taxpayer’s taste and subsequently the issue is to avoid wasting of tax money. The argument “our people don’t want this”, i.e., the reference to the „people“, is, however, no feature of a democratic mindset. Art is in its phase of evolution always a minority culture. It would be impermissible to interpret the guarantee of art freedom as a privileging of artists; it only has a protective function to create a reasonable and fair compensation for asymmetric power relations that had a repressive effect in the past. The populist advocacy for the “interests of the people” is rather to be found in totalitarian systems, as behind a constructed „volonté générale“ dictatorships hide their authoritarism. At times, though, the language of populist cultural politicians becomes clear and straightforward. Andreas Mölzer (FPÖ), once cultural advisor of Jörg Haider in his function as provincial governor of Carinthia, for example, warned against politically oppositional artists and thus justified the withdrawal of funding with the outspoken statement: „... after all, you shouldn’t bite the hand that feeds you.“ [xvii]

In the case of a politically motivated divestment of public funds some politicians take advantage of a legal vacuum, since the function of public art funding is formulated in very general terms. While using qualitative criteria for the “development and cultivation of the arts“, so the legal aim of Federal Arts Promotion Law is basically permissible, it does not warrant a state ruling on art, an ideological or party-politically motivated art funding policy. It is legally very difficult, if not almost impossible to dispute against a decision ruling made by federal or provincial authorities responsible for cultural policy issues. Funding the arts is to some degree a free-will act of the state and the public authorities act here like any odd private company.

Mediation – An Alternative Way of Dealing with Art Conflicts

In addition to media visibility and jurisdiction, there is also the option of conflict mediation. Here the conditions for a sensible use of mediation are highly restrictive. If a conflict is a “specious” conflict, that is, if is artificially produced by a conflict party, because it needs a pretense to reach certain political goals (e.g., to unite media attention, mobilization of adherents and diverse groups behind it), then dialogue is neither possible nor desired.

In the case of a „real“ conflict, the path to dialogue should be the first choice. Generally speaking, I believe that it is better when people perceive the responsibility for their conflicts themselves and do not leave this to the decision-making competence of their legal representatives and courts. Moreover, the requirement that lawyers adhere to a conflict party is almost in every case counter-productive and adverse to a settlement. Enforcing a one-sided solution of cultural conflicts often lays the ground for future disputes. A dialogue between conflicting parties – possibly with the help of neutral mediators – can often prevent the unwarranted criminalization of single individuals, as, can, for instance, happen through a court ruling, or the very profound animosity that can be triggered off by constant moralizing incriminations in the media. In this sense I would like to make an appeal here for a dialogue approach that might server to promote the resolution of art conflicts.

The very first question to be discussed is: Is communication and constructive dispute on cultural or ethical problems possible to begin with? (Communication here is not just referred to in a purely technical sense, but rather the concept of communication must, as Jürgen Habermas emphasizes, be grasped in a normative way as well.) In my view the answer cannot be a principle yes or no, but rather a more or less that must relate to communicative contexts. Some analytic philosophers believe that the opacity and inclarity of everyday language can only be eliminated by means of critique of language. However, the project of cleansing language from metaphysical and logically inconsistent old burdens can today be regarded a failed or at best epistemical unimplementable. Linguistic analysis, of course, continues to be a useful instrument, but issues related to the concept of art transcend its scope and competence. Here, as analysis alone is not enough, you have to proceed in a practice-oriented and interpretative way.

The structure of communicative practice is, in any case, controversial. Some adhere to a notion of communicative rationality (e.g., Karl Jaspers, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas). Others, in turn, most notably some postmodern thinkers like Jean-François Lyotard insisted that a consensus, a real conciliation can never be brought about between the various normative viewpoints and forms of life. Everything thus revolves around power and domination and are the basic determinants of any conversation. I would like to follow an intermediate position that a debate on „essentially contested concepts“ which William Gallie would see as conditional. The prerequisites for communication are, as already mentioned, not easily given. Therefore the following prerequisites should only be understood as ideal-type conditions. [xviii]

-          Common epistemic basis: A constructive debate is possible if the parties involved agree to a common ground, for instance, agree on common definitions or the shared recognition of some „authorities“ or “standards”. (If the epistemic dissonance is especially pronounced, as, for example, among representatives of a critical avant-garde and ultra-conservatives, an understanding is impossible.)

-          Engagement: The contrahents in a debate must believe at least in part in the meaningfulness of the dispute, that is, also in the possibility of distinguishing between the legitimate and unfounded arguments. It would be cynical and meaningless to initiate a process of mediation, if a conflict party in the dialogue is not willing to be honest.

-           Veracity and uprightousness: A debate on substantially controversial concepts can only succeed if the contrahents encounter each other with a bit of goodwill, respect and recognition. (This is the normative imperative for any mutual communication.) A state that must be eliminated is the tendency to no longer discuss the facts at hand but to summarily to view the adversary side as the actual problem. The most difficult thing to achieve is a relaxed atmosphere for dialogue where the contrahents give up the goal of trying to defeat the others at any price.

-           Relative equality of negotiating positions, that is, fairness: One of the most frequent causes for a negotiation to not materialize or to fail is the extreme power asymmetry that prevails prior to a conflict or appears in the course of a communicative interaction. The basic conditions for articulating and defending the various positions and interests must be optimized for all conflicting parties.

-          Linguistic style: Since aesthetic-symbolic conflicts are value conflicts that are based on different ways of life, ideology and beliefs, it is amenable to communication if a valuative and moralizing language is avoided.

The complexity of art conflicts that have, in part, historical or in part, socio-cultural causes, makes it impossible here to speak of patent solutions. The exclusion of the media public is often well-advised, because otherwise the actors would feel compelled to make self-promotion. Moreover, media reports sometimes have a moralizing linguistic style that can suggest a scandal and sabotage trust-raising measures. Engaging in a dialogue and getting to know the other demands a lot of energy and time on the one hand but also facilitates processes of learning and represents important chances for growth on the other. What is gained is a richness of experience and social competence and, subsequently, a more circumspect way of dealing with foreignness and otherness. If those involved succeeded in showing more understanding to those who think differently then it is also a gain in humanitarianism.

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